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Objective This study examined the impact of state budget cuts on uncompensated care at
general acute care hospital organizations. This study capitalized on the variations in the states
of Texas and California to form a natural experiment testing the joint impact of budget cut status
on uncompensated care costs, as well as specific charity care costs and bad debt expenses from
indigent patients.
Methodology Budget cuts in the state of Texas occurred in the year 2004. Information was
obtained from the Texas Department of Health and the California Department of Health Services
regarding financial characteristics of hospitals and from the American Hospital Directory annual
survey regarding organizational characteristics of hospitals. We created three dependent vari-
ables: RUC (the ratio of total uncompensated care costs to gross patient revenue), RCC (the ratio
of charity care to total patient revenue) and RBD (the ratio of bad debt expenses to gross patient
revenue). Using a two-period panel data set and individual hospital fixed effects, we captured
hospital uncompensated care spending that could also have influenced budget cut status. Addi-
tionally, the impact of the state budget cut status on hospitals’ uncompensated care spending,
charity care spending and bad debt expenses was also estimated using the similar methodology.
Population studied In this study, we included 416 (in Texas) and 352 (in California) public,
not-for-profit (NFP) and for-profit (FP) hospitals that completed the annual survey during the
study period 2002–2005.
Findings For the state of Texas, results from the fixed effect model confirmed that the year 2005
was directly related to increased RUC and RCC. The coefficients of 2005 were significantly and
positively associated with RUC (0.43, p< 0.05) and RCC (0.29, p< 0.05). These results supported
the findings that the RUC and the RCC would be more positively associated with 2005 than any
other year, with other things being equal. However, for the state of California, even though the
coefficient of 2005 was significant and positively associated with RCC (0.31, p< 0.05), the
coefficient of uncompensated care spending was not statistically significant for 2005.*Correspondence to: Won S. Suh, Department of Global Healthcare Management, Gachon University,
Seoul, Korea. E-mail: suhw@gachon.ac.kr
†This research was supported by Gachon University 2012.
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89UNCOMPENSATED CARE SPENDING IN HOSPITALSConclusion The healthcare industry is characterized by increased regulation, a growing number
of uninsured patients, increasingly stringent reimbursement and competitive practices among
hospitals and other providers. Federal and state healthcare agencies are restricting the criteria
for eligibility for outlier payments and uncompensated care provisions. Tax exempt status of
many NFP hospitals is being examined and tied to specific performances, particularly the provi-
sion of uncompensated care. This study provides evidence of the impact of budget cut pressure on
uncompensated care provided in Texas general acute care hospitals. Copyright © 2012 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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According to an estimate provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(2010), the US healthcare industry amounted to $2.3 trillion in 2008 compared with
$253 billion about two decades ago. In 2004, the American Hospital Association
reported that about 73% of 5759 hospitals established in the society consist of private
not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals (AHA, 2004). These hospitals perform the role of provid-
ing charity care services and subsidized services to indigent Americans nationwide. A
classical case can be seen with the state of Texas, which faced one of the largest
revenue drops of about $7.4 billion and an estimated deficit of $9.9 billion. These
figures represented about 15% of the general revenue spending for FY 2004–2005
biennium. The shortfall in Texas in terms of this dramatic revenue decrease was attrib-
uted to the increased state spending onMedicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP). Policy makers concluded that the only solution that could resolve
budget crisis was to reduce the burden of this health-related expenditure (Hadley and
Holahan, 2004).
Historically, internal cross-subsidization has been rampant in US hospitals that
use surplus from the government to cover the costs of uncovered services or uncom-
pensated care (Vladeck, 2006; Simpson and Shin, 1998). Weissman defines uncom-
pensated care as the sum of charity care and bad debt expenses (Weissman, 2005).
Charity care is the amount that hospitals spend to provide services on a charitable
basis without any payment expectation. On the other hand, bad debt expenses com-
prise the amount that hospitals spend for provision of services with the expectation of
complete payments but for which only partial payments are received (Desai et al.,
2000; Young and Desai, 1999). The year 2004 saw the highest number of uninsured
patients in the state of Texas compared with other states in the USA, with as high as
5.4million uninsured people (US Census, 2004). Thus, given the prevalence of the
critical financial status of hospitals, (i) the growth in government spending in healthcare
due to the aging baby boomers and (ii) the tax benefits and exemptions enjoyed by
hospitals make it important to determine an equitable and reliable measure of uncom-
pensated care expenditure. An unconventional trend, compared with the remainder of
the US states, could be witnessed while studying the consequences of budget cut in
Texas on its SCHIP enrollment. According to the report of the Kaiser Commission
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, there was an increment in the national SCHIP enroll-
ment by around 25 000 (an increase of 0.6%) during the period fromDecember 2003 toCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
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increased SCHIP enrollment, but 13 states had decreased SCHIP enrollment. Texas had
the largest decline in SCHIP enrollment, with a drop of 23% that consists of about
102 000 enrollees. SCHIP enrollment continued to decrease in 2004, dropping from
438 000 in December 2003 to 360 000 in June 2004. This decline continued in the
upcoming months, with only 336 000 people enrolled in SCHIP by December 2004
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2005). Another Kaiser Family
Foundation report confirmed that the drastic decline in Texas SCHIP enrollment by
more than 149 000 children (about 29%) was due to the impact of state budget cuts
2004. The primary reason leading to this decline in Texas was the reduced enrollment
in SCHIP and the increased disenrollment of already enrolled children (Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2004).
According to Thorpe et al. (2000), uncompensated care provided by US hospitals
amounts to a large sum of $30 billion. The emergence of uncompensated charges in
the form of provision of care for the seriously ill and non-paying indigent patients
occurring in an environment of increasing costs and curtailed revenues further preci-
pitates in reduction of revenues, surmounting costs and shift of resources from
paying patients to non-paying patients (GAO, 2005; Fishman and Bentley, 1997).
In the current scenario where hospitals are facing a tremendous increase in the
number of uninsured patients, they are accused of charity shifting to self-pay
patients. Phelps indicates that when Medicare or public agencies reduce the amounts
that they pay to the hospitals for inpatient care, hospitals indulge in charge shifting,
which involves recovering some of their costs by raising prices for privately insured
patients (Phelps, 1986; Wedig et al., 1988). The financial viability of healthcare
providers serving indigent population is jeopardized by state budget cut pressure
in a number of ways primarily affecting provider payment rates, provider ability to
treat indigent patients and benefit cuts. State budget cut pressure poses a dual threat
of not only endangering a provider’s revenue but also increasing the burden of
uncompensated care (Hoadley et al., 2004; Wright, 1998; Mann et al., 1995; Melnick
and Zwanziger, 1995).
Several studies have examined the structure of hospital costs. Patients admitted
through the emergency department (ED) experience higher disease burden and will
incur higher costs compared with other patients. The healthcare costs incurred owing
to ED-related admissions lead to further increase in inpatient costs because ED
patients receive services generally procured outside the hospital such as various
routine diagnostic tests, screenings and regular procedures (Gaynor and Anderson,
1995; Robinson and Luft, 1985; Grannemann et al., 1986; Dor and Farley, 1996).
Also, most of the patients admitted through ED are uninsured, avoid primary care
services, are hospitalized when their disease condition advances and require a long
recovery time. Thus, the length of hospital stay for ED patients is much longer
compared with other patients. One research study in New York showed evidence
that on average, patients admitted through ED stayed in the hospital for 5 days extra
compared with patients admitted through outpatient departments and about 3 days
extra compared with patients admitted by a healthcare practitioner (Gaynor and
Anderson, 1995; Harris and Stergachis, 1990). Hospitals located in the metropolitan
areas provide care to a large number of uninsured populations compared withCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
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much more than treating patients who are not poor even though they belong to the
same diagnosis-related group (DRG). Higher treatment costs incurred by providing
care for the severely ill are not sufficiently measured by the existent case mix indexes
(CMIs). This might lead to further increase in uncompensated care. Evidence from
previous literature shows that case mix, teaching affiliation, bed size and hospital
location have an impact on unit costs. Hospitals located in the metropolitan areas
provide care to a large number of uninsured populations compared with hospitals
located in the non-metropolitan areas. The cost of treating of poor patients is much
more than treating patients who are not poor even though they belong to the same
DRG (Martin et al., 1984; Davis, 1991).
The increase in Medicare and Medicaid fees for service payments from 1990 to
1998 helped alleviate the burden of uncompensated care shouldered by the hospitals.
The payment-to-cost ratio increased from 89.2% to 103.6% for Medicare from 1990
to 1997 and from 79.7% to 97.9% for Medicaid from 1990 to 1998, respectively.
However, with the emergence of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 and
increase in the number of managed care enrollees, the payment-to-cost ratio fell in
1999 to 101.1% and 96.7% for Medicare and Medicaid, respectively. The initiation
of the Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program provided financial assistance
to hospitals providing care to Medicaid and Medicare populations. The Medicaid
funding for the DSH program, which was increased from $800million in 1990 to
$10.6 billion in 1995, was cut short because of the BBA in 1997. This cutback in
funding not only led the hospitals to restrict healthcare access to poor people but also
threatened the viability of the hospitals playing a major role in providing uncompen-
sated care according to the community needs. Medicaid patients receive higher
uncompensated care compared with Medicare patients (Hsieh and Clement, 2010;
Coughlin and Liska, 1997). Teaching hospitals also incur more uncompensated care
because they take in patients with a variety of disease conditions. The patients pro-
vide educational value to the medical graduates, and the medical education payments
from Medicare help to offset some of the uncompensated care expenses. They also
are more likely to be larger than non-teaching hospitals and are located in urban
and economically depressed inner-city areas (HCIA, 1997). The graduate medical
education payment is majorly supported by Medicare. With the emergence of the
BBA in 1997, Medicare reduced these payments from 7.7% (accounting for every
10% increase in the ratio of residents to bed) to 7.0%, 6.5% and 6.0% in 1998,
1999 and 2000, respectively. The reduction in medical education payments covered
by Medicare not only forced the hospitals to support a limited number of medical
residents but also increased the burden of uncompensated care for the urban teaching
hospitals (Rosko, 2004a, b).
To our knowledge, this is one of the few studies trying to find systematic evidence
about price elevation witnessed in Texas hospitals for procuring healthcare services
to inflate escalated uncompensated care expenditure during the budget cut crisis of
2004. This analysis adds to the prior literature by investigating the factors that might
relate the utilization of uncompensated care to the location of hospitals, as a means to
mitigate state budget cut pressure as well as management of net revenues reported. It
tries to identify and characterize the group of hospitals on the basis of provision ofCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
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crisis in Texas. This study aimed to measure and evaluate uncompensated care by
comparing it with total costs and net patient revenue revealed by the financial state-
ments of hospitals. Specifically, this study aimed to compare the components of
uncompensated care, that is, charity care and bad debt expenses, with deductions
from net hospital revenues. It also scrutinizes the difference, if any, in the association
of reported uncompensated care and the state budget cut pressure of 2004.DATA AND METHODS
To assess how hospitals adjust their prices and their level of reported uncompensated
care in response to increased financial and political pressures, data sources were
obtained from the Texas Department of Health and the California Department of
Health Services regarding financial characteristics of hospitals and from the American
Hospital Directory annual survey regarding organizational characteristics of hospitals.
We included general acute care hospitals in the analyses and excluded specialty hospi-
tals (facilities that emphasize long-term care) and psychiatry hospitals for comparability
reasons and owing to variations in different reimbursement systems. We also excluded
all federal hospitals, which are mainly Veterans Administration and military hospitals,
as they serve a separate population, which makes them incomparable. In the sample
period 2005–2006, 416 public, NFP and for-profit (FP) hospitals in Texas and 352
public, NFP and FP hospitals in California completed the annual survey.
We created three ratios as outcome variables in this study. RUC is the ratio of total
uncompensated care costs to gross patient revenue. RCC is the ratio of charity care to
gross patient revenue. RBD is the ratio of bad debt charge to gross patient revenue.
RUC, RCC and RBD are hospital spending values derived as follows:
RUC ¼ Total uncompensated care=Total gross patient revenues
RCC ¼ Total charity care=Total gross patient revenues
RBD ¼ Total bad debt charges=Total gross patient revenues
We performed trend and comparative analyses for the dependent variables to
examine the change in the historical financial ratios distribution. The mean values
and tests of the mean differences among 2002, 2003 and 2005 were derived for
the aforementioned three samples and for the following variables:
CHR ¼ Charity care ðin dollarsÞ
UNC uncompensated care ¼ Charity careþ Bad debt
BD ¼ Bad debt charges
Tests of differences were conducted using both Student’s t-test and signed ranktest of differences. We calculated bad debt as a percentage of uncompensated careCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
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pensated care changes across the test period. We also examined bad debt expenses as a
percentage of revenue. The analysis of uncompensated care as a percentage of revenue
was to determine whether uncompensated care changed as a result of any changes in
bad debt. The explanatory model is of the following general form:
RUC RCC;RBDð Þ ht ¼ f Xht;Mhtð Þ
Measures of the primary dependent variables are the ratio of uncompensated care
to gross patient revenue (RUC). To be more specific, we created two more specific
sub-dependent variables (RCC and RBD). The measure of the sub-dependent variables
is the ratio of charity care and bad debt expenses to gross patient revenue, respec-
tively. Thus, our independent variables were based on the hospital spending in Texas
and California based on the ratios (of total uncompensated care, charity care and bad
debt expenses) to gross patient revenue. Independent variables were based on prior
literature review. Our proposed model contained a number of explanatory variables
believed to influence uncompensated care. The primary independent variable was
the year effect of budget cut pressure in 2004. We also included other independent
covariates such as CMI, number of admissions in the hospitals, Medicare patient
days as a percentage of total patient days, Medicaid patient days as a percentage
of total patient days, average length of stay (ALOS) in the hospitals and occupancy rate
of the hospitals. The Medicare Severity—Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRGs)
classifies severity of a disease condition into three levels. CMI is defined as the average
relative weight for all cases reported with regards to MS-DRGs at a particular severity
level. MS-DRGs for disease conditions with lower severity have lower relative
weights, andMS-DRGs for disease conditions with higher severity have higher relative
weights. Generally, for determining the CMI, a “base” MS-DRG is used, which
combines the different levels of disease severity into a single level. Base MS-DRGs
with a single severity level are widely used for reporting as compared with MS-DRGs
with variable severity levels. The number of admissions includes adult and pediatric
patients who are admitted during the reported period. It does not include births but
includes neonatal and swing admissions. The ALOS comprises of the average number
of days that an adult or a pediatric patient is admitted in the hospital. The ALOS is
calculated by dividing the total number of patient days by the number of patient admis-
sions or patient discharges. A patient day is also called a census day or an inpatient day
of care or an occupied bed day. An occupied bed day is calculated as the period during
which a service is delivered between the census-taking hours on two successive calen-
dar days provided that the discharge date is the same as the admission date. Occupancy
rate is the number of inpatient days of care or the number of hospital bed days divided
by the quantity of available beds in the hospital multiplied by the number of days for the
specific year. Medicare inpatient days include inpatient days where Medicare is the
source of payment. The care is funded for Medicare enrollees covered under the tradi-
tional fee-for-service plan or theMedicareManaged Care Plan.Medicare fee-for-service
claims for inpatients are covered under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System
(IPPS), which covers acute inpatient care such as operating expenses and other capital
expenses. Payments under the IPPS are predetermined and are based on the patient’sCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
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Medicare inpatients can receive care for 60 consecutive days per episode of illness in
a hospital or skilled nursing facility. Medicaid inpatient days include inpatient days
where Medicaid acts as the source of payment. The care is funded for Medicaid enrollees
covered under the traditional fee-for-service plan, the Medicaid Managed Care Plan, the
Medicaid DSH and the Medicaid supplemental payments. The Medicaid supplemental
payments are supplemental payments other than the Medicaid DSH payments paid by
Medicaid to hospitals that exclude associated provider taxes or assessments (American
Hospital Association, 2009; American Hospital Directory, 2009; Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, 2009; Dalpatadu et al., 2007). In addition, we included several
hospital characteristics such as teaching status (teaching versus non-teaching), hospital
governance (NFP, FP and public), hospital location (metropolitan versus non-metropolitan),
and hospital bed size (<25, 26–100, 101–250 and >250). Finally, to examine the
impact of the state budget cut crisis, the use of a year dummy variable was included.
The samples consisted of 416 hospitals for Texas and 352 hospitals for California
for each year that had NFP, FP and public hospitals by using reports of each state’s
Department of Health. In the multivariate analysis, we merged the data sets for of
2002, 2003 and 2005 into one data set. Separate fixed effects by hospitals for OLS
regression analyses examined the impact of hospital size, ALOS, occupancy rate,
Medicare and Medicaid patients’ days, CMI, teaching status, and hospital governance
on hospitals’ uncompensated care, charity care and bad debt expenses spending with
acute care hospitals for both states.RESULTS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of variables associated with uncompensated
care during the test period. Before 2004, the means of bad debt and charity care
expenses were $7 861 275 and $8 600 195 in Texas and $5 171 235 and $3 900 106
in California, respectively. For CMI, these were 1.20 (before 2004) and 1.18 (after
2004) in Texas. They were 1.29 (before 2004) and 1.28 (after 2004) in California.
As far as hospital locations were concerned, about 298 hospitals (71.46%) were
located in a metropolitan area, and the remaining hospitals (28.54%) were located
in non-metropolitan areas in Texas. In California, there were 192 hospitals
(54.55%) located in the metropolitan areas, and the remaining 160 hospitals
(45.45%) were located in the non-metropolitan areas.
Table 2 indicates the mean differences among major variables (bad debt expenses,
charity care and gross patient revenue) during the test period. The mean differences
among all these three variables were statistically significant (p< 0.05) during the
study period.
Results for uncompensated care, charity care, bad debt expenses and covariates
are reported in Table 3. Results of the year effect variable confirm that 2005 was
directly related to increased hospital spending of uncompensated care and charity
care in Texas. The coefficients of the year effect of 2005 were significantly and
positively associated with uncompensated care (0.43, p< 0.05) and charity care
(0.29, p< 0.05). These results indicate that among the years 2002, 2003 and 2005,Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
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Table 2. Mean difference of major variables during the test period
Major variables Texas California
Bad debt expenses $3 543 710* $1 723 503*
Charity care $5 875 363* $1 671 688*
Gross patient revenue $15 500 982* $4 917 943*
*p< 0.05.
96 J. CHANG ET AL.with other things being equal, the spending of uncompensated care and charity care
was more positively related to 2005 compared with 2002 and 2003.
Table 3 also shows that the spending for charity care was more positively related
to NFP hospitals than for others. Compared with NFP hospitals in Texas, results for
hospital governance indicate that FP hospitals were directly related to decreased spend-
ing of charity care [1.05 (p< 0.05) vs. 1.88 (p< 0.1)] in Texas and California,
respectively. Compared with 2002, 2003 and 2005, for CMI, the coefficients for
uncompensated care and charity care were 1.23 (p< 0.1) and 0.85 (p< 0.1) in Texas,
respectively. For hospitals located in the metropolitan areas in Texas, the coefficients
for uncompensated care and charity care were 0.28 (p< 0.05) and 0.2 (p< 0.05),
respectively, compared with hospitals located in the non-metropolitan areas. In California,
the coefficients for uncompensated care and charity care for metropolitan hospitals
were 0.24 (p< 0.1) and 0.18 (p< 0.1) compared with non-metropolitan hospitals.DISCUSSION
The healthcare industry is regulated and burdened by a growing number of unin-
sured patients, increasingly stringent reimbursement and growing competition
between hospitals and other providers. Federal and state healthcare agencies are
increasing the standards of eligibility for outlier payments and uncompensated care
provisions. Tax exempt status of many NFP hospitals is being examined and tied
to specific performance, particularly the provision of uncompensated care. This
study provides empirical evidence of the impact of the Texas budget cut pressure
on provision of uncompensated care as reported by Texas acute care hospitals.
Community benefit includes healthcare assistance to Medicaid population and
other indigent federal or state population in the form of donations, research, health
programs and other related activities (Texas Health and Safety Code, 2007). The
demand of community needs is a major driver of charity care delivered by hospitals.
If the community needs are same as or more than the amount of care delivered by
hospitals, then hospitals will either provide the necessary care or provide care
surpassing their ability to deliver. On the other hand, some hospitals might also
deliver charity care to the community in an amount proportionate to securing tax
benefits (Bryce, 2001). Community benefit laws are different in California and
Texas. Under the California community benefit law, hospitals’ charity care is process
oriented, and hospitals are supposed to submit a community benefits plan to the
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development every year. The hospitals
are not obligated to provide any set amount of charity care (California Health andCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
DOI: 10.1002/hpm
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98 J. CHANG ET AL.Safety Code, 2008). Texas non-profit hospitals, on the other hand, have the following
community benefit laws that abide the hospitals to provide pre-established amount of
charity care and government-sponsored unreimbursed care: (i) in accordance to the
need of the community, tax exempt benefits and the hospital’s financial reserves,
(ii) in an amount equal to or more than the advantages derived by the hospitals due
to their tax exempt status or (iii) in an amount equivalent to at least 4% of the net patient
revenue. Some non-profit hospitals in Texas also provide charity care and community
benefits in an amount equivalent to about 5% of the net patient revenue (Texas Health
and Safety Code, 2007; OSHPD, 1998; Sutton and Stensland, 2004). Many studies
have shown that NFP hospitals provide more charity care compared with FP hospitals
Herzlinger and Krasker (1987); Lewin et al., 1988; Thorpe and Phelps, 1991; Norton
and Staiger, 1994; Weissman, 1996). There are some possible reasons contributing to
the charitable nature of the NFP hospitals. NFP hospitals share disproportionate burden
of charity care compared with FP hospitals, which in turn further discourages FP
hospitals from providing charity care. This might be the case in Texas as previous
studies have shown that NFP hospitals in Texas sometimes generously provide
community benefits more than they are required to, even in the absence of community
benefit and charity care laws in order to promote their self interests such as conducting
research and training of graduate medical students (Clement et al., 1994; Buchmueller
and Feldstein, 1996; Sanders, 1993; Herzlinger and Krasker, 1987; Spencer, 1998).
The unreimbursed care of NFP hospitals might be the result of unreimbursed care of
Medicaid andMedicare patients.Many times, there is “crowding out” by NFP hospitals
leading to delivery of extra charity care by NFP hospitals. This extra charity care deliv-
ered by NFP hospitals leads to a reduction in the amount of charity care to be delivered
by FP hospitals. Compared with Texas, our study shows more “crowding out” by NFP
hospitals in California where NFP hospitals (n=191) are almost double in number
compared with FP hospitals (n= 86; Table 1). This might be one of the reasons that
charity care is significant in California. Even though FP hospitals deliver a small
amount of charity care, it might help them build goodwill that might further attract
business from different buyers of healthcare services. Patients cannot easily differenti-
ate between the quality of care obtained in NFP and FP hospitals. Hospitals with strong
goodwill are presumed to deliver quality care to their patients. Thus, FP hospitals can
attract business and use the profits generated due to the same for expansions and
mergers (Seay et al., 1986; Hirth, 1997; Marsteller et al., 1998).
For-profit hospitals, even though providing community service to the communities,
choose to serve and select markets where there is less likelihood of providing a sizeable
proportion of charity care (Seay et al., 1986). A study conducted by the University of
California at Los Angeles located 12 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with higher-
than-average uninsured rates in Texas and California, which have large concentrations
of immigrants (Commonwealth Fund, 2000). The study noted that in these MSAs, the
Hispanic population accounts for a large percentage of the moderate-income and low-
income residents who are less likely to be insured (Texas Department of Insurance,
2004). According to our study, Texas has doubled the number of hospitals in the
metropolitan areas (n=298) compared with the non-metropolitan areas (n=119), com-
pared with California, which has almost equal number of hospitals in the metropolitan
(n= 192) and non-metropolitan areas (n=160; Table 1). Most of the NFP hospitals areCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
DOI: 10.1002/hpm
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(Texas Fact Sheet, 2006). The higher number of NFP hospitals located in the metropolitan
areas of Texas might be contributing to significant uncompensated care in Texas. The
metropolitan/non-metropolitan differences found in this study substantiate claims that
metropolitan hospitals, which are non-profit, act as major drivers in increasing hospital
bad debt and fulfilling the need for charity care. Hence, policy makers need to divert
their attention to hospitals located in the metropolitan areas.
From 2002 to 2007, the cumulative rise in the healthcare premiums was as high as
78% compared with 17% of cumulative inflation and 19% of cumulative wage
growth, respectively. Increase in the healthcare premiums leads to people paying
more for their insurance plan compared with the previous years. The type of insur-
ance plan determines the coverage of services and the out-of-pocket expenditure
borne by people. In 2004, the average out-of-pocket expenditure amounted to about
34% (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007). Increase in the healthcare premiums can be
attributed to factors such as (i) increases in prescription drug prices, (ii) increases in
prescription drug usage, (iii) increases in physician fees, (iv) increases in specialist
physician visits, (v) increases in home health, outpatient surgery, physical therapy
and other ancillary services and (vi) administrative costs for health insurance related
to case management, disease management, fraud and abuse prevention. The increase in
health insurance premiums is causing more employees not to have any insurance
coverage, and being uninsured causes more patients to visit the Emergency Room
(ER) and have bad debts. The increased number of patients visiting the ER and the bud-
get cut pressure further increase the burden of uncompensated care shouldered by the
non-profit hospitals, which is in turn being cost shifted to patients with insurance. Thus,
the numbers of uninsured people increase further, increasing the burden of uncompen-
sated care faced by hospitals (Strayhorn, 2005). However, hospital bad debts account
for a small portion of increase in annual hospital expenditures as well as the medical
expenditures borne by the insurers. Combined efforts by the state government as well
as the hospitals could assist the hospitals in alleviating their financial losses. The policy
implications for the state government include initiating changes in several insurance-
related factors such as reduction of cuts to the Medicaid program, expansion of the
SCHIP program, increase in the federal funding for Medicaid program, encouragement
to purchase insurance by providing federal tax credits and provision of Medicaid
waiver to ensure affordable insurance for indigent population (Texas Comptroller of
Public Accounts, 2001a, 2001b; Walker et al., 2005). The hospitals can divert the
ER patients to community health centers (CHCs) operated by primary care providers
(PCPs), which will ensure provision of cost-effective healthcare services to indigent
populations. This not only reduces uncompensated healthcare costs but also leads to
proper dissemination of information by the PCPs to patients, thereby taking care of
the non-emergent healthcare needs of some of the ER patients in the long run. How-
ever, it is essential that sustainable partnerships be built between the hospitals and
the CHCs (Bennett et al., 2007; Nykamp and Ruggles, 2000; Davidson et al., 2003,
McCarthy et al., 2002; Steiner et al., 2002).
A review of the literature provides evidence of changes in the hospitals’ spending
behavior impacted by cost containment (Hadley et al., 1996). Data also illustrate
differences in the uncompensated care and charity care after 2004 compared withCopyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2012; 27: 88–103.
DOI: 10.1002/hpm
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and measure the consistency of provision of uncompensated care. This study pro-
vides an important policy directive in terms of assessing unintended consequences,
if any, to implement an uncompensated care policy.LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations to this analysis. Primarily, there is a possibility of selection
history threat that occurs when the outcomes of an event are measured between the pre-
observation and post-observation periods. In this case, there is a potential for such a
threat given the possibility of the uncompensated care legislature actions suspending
the future funding for Medicaid beneficiaries occurring during the same time frame
as the Texas budget cut in 2004. Although this may only affect the Medicaid popula-
tion, it can still result in skewed results. As a potential solution, Medicaid patients
may be analyzed separately to account for such a threat. Secondly, because of data un-
availability, this study excluded some of the market factors such as HMO penetration
and self-insured paying patients that could impact uncompensated care. There was a
lack of consistency in capturing these variables in the annual surveys. The survey did
not differentiate patients who possess insurance but still contribute to bad debt
expenses. These variables, if could be captured, would potentially provide a more
accurate assessment about which of the dependent variables (charity care or bad debt
expenses) would significantly affect uncompensated care burden borne by hospitals.CONCLUSIONS
In spite of the limitations, this study provides an important step for filling a gap
towards understanding spending behaviors associated with uncompensated care.
The study provides an estimate of the uncompensated care charge with respect to
net patient revenue and its association with resource allocation among hospitals
based on the type of hospital governance. Not only does it highlight the need to look
at trends in uncompensated care spending by hospitals, but it also shows the need to
identify and study trends across the different types of hospitals.ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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